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SY-DAVID FRIEDMAN∗, CLAUDIO TERNULLO†
Abstract. The Hyperuniverse Programme, introduced in Arrigoni and Friedman (2013),
fosters the search for new set-theoretic axioms. In this paper, we present the procedure
envisaged by the programme to find new axioms and the conceptual framework behind it.
The procedure comes in several steps. Intrinsically motivated axioms are those statements
which are suggested by the standard concept of set, i.e. the ‘maximal iterative concept’,
and the programme identifies higher-order statements motivated by the maximal iterative
concept. The satisfaction of these statements (H-axioms) in countable transitive models,
the collection of which constitutes the ‘hyperuniverse’ (H), has remarkable first-order
consequences, some of which we review in §5.
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1. New set-theoretic axioms
Over the last years, there has been an intense debate within the set-theoretic community
concerning the acceptance or non-acceptance of several set-theoretic statements such as
V=L, large cardinals, axioms of determinacy (AD, PD, ADL(R)) or forcing axioms (MA,
PFA, etc.) and the discussion seems to be nowhere near being settled.
The received view concerning an axiom is that it should be ‘self-evident’, i.e., that it
should be immediately, and with little effort, acknowledged as true. If such a view is still
to be held, then there is no hope to accept the aforementioned statements as new axioms.1
But even if one discards the ‘self-evidence view’ as inapplicable, there are still deep issues
which have to be addressed by anyone supporting the acceptance of one or more of the
statements mentioned above and, more generally, of any axiom candidate.
First of all, there is often a lack of intrinsic motivation for such statements, where, by
‘intrinsic’, as explained at length in the sections below, we mean ‘required by the concept
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1Of course, it is also as much debatable that the standard axioms of set theory, that is, ZFC, are all
‘self-evident’. A very natural case in point is the Axiom of Choice, but one may have equally reasonable
reservations on the Axioms of Infinity, Replacement or Foundation. A thorough discussion of some of these
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of set’. Secondly, the view that a new axiom should be accepted as true of the realm of sets
has been seriously challenged by the independence phenomenon and the related existence
of a set-theoretic multiverse: it is often relatively easy to produce a universe of sets which
contradicts a given set-theoretic statement. Finally, all new axiom candidates are first-
order and one main worry we want to bring out in this paper is precisely that first-order
principles may be too weak to capture further properties of the cumulative set-theoretic
hierarchy.
One clear preliminary upshot of the informal considerations above is the following: it
is unlikely that any new first-order axiom candidate will be accepted on its own as an
intrinsically motivated principle of set theory. Granted, it might still be accepted on
purely extrinsic grounds, but it is not clear that this would be sufficient evidence for its
acceptance.
In this paper, we are going to propose an alternative way to identify new intrinsically
motivated set-theoretic axioms, which originates from the conceptual framework of the
Hyperuniverse Programme, as detailed in Arrigoni and Friedman (2013), and which fosters
a revisionary conception of what a ‘new’ axiom is. In our view, new axioms are higher-
order set-theoretic principles, more specifically principles expressing the maximality of the
universe of sets (V ). The latter are strong mathematical propositions, some of which
have been gradually isolated and examined in recent years in work by the first author and
others, and, more recently, by the first author and Honzik.2 We believe that there is a
sense in which such propositions, as will be presented in §5, can legitimately claim to be
motivated by the concept of set and, by virtue of this, be viewed as intrinsically motivated
new axioms.
It should be mentioned that all of these statements have striking first-order set-theoretic
consequences, which we will describe in more detail in the next sections and this fact,
although not representing an intrinsic justification for their acceptance, indisputably adds
to their mathematical attractiveness.
One further goal of the Hyperuniverse Programme is to find one single ‘optimal’ max-
imality principle, whose acceptance would, thus, lead to identifying one single collection
of first-order consequences. Therefore, our foundational project fosters the view that the
procedure described here might also count as a procedure to find solutions to the open
problems of set theory. However, the notion of ‘solution’, here, is inevitably as much
revisionary as that of ‘new’ axiom.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In §2-3, we briefly discuss the features of
‘intrinsic’ evidence and set forth our conception of the set-theoretic universe as being a
‘vertical’ multiverse. In §4, we introduce the hyperuniverse as our auxiliary multiverse,
wherein one can investigate the consequences of the maximality of V , through the use of
V -logic. In §5, we enunciate maximality principles for V which, in our view, are motivated
by the concept of set. In §6 we discuss the notion of ‘new’ axiom qua H-axiom, then, in §7,
we proceed to make some final considerations. Finally, in §8, as an appendix, we present
2See, in particular, Friedman (2006), Arrigoni and Friedman (2012), Arrigoni and Friedman (2013) and
Friedman and Honzik (nd).
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some results which show that a heavily investigated collection of new set-theoretic axioms,
absoluteness axioms, which has recently received a lot of extrinsic support, may fall short
of the requirements described above.
2. Intrinsic evidence for new axioms
2.1. Brief remarks on ontology and truth. In the next pages, we will be making
frequent reference to issues of ontology and truth and it is maybe appropriate to briefly
address these issues before examining the notion of intrinsic evidence.
On the grounds of what the programme aims to yield, i.e. new set-theoretic axioms, it
is entirely natural to ask whether new axioms should be seen as ‘true’ statements of set
theory, and in what sense. We will make it clear in the next section in what sense they
should be viewed as ‘true’, but first we want to say something more general about ‘truth’.
The programme’s position is that axioms do not reflect truth in an independent realm
of mathematical entities. It is rather the concept of set that plays a key role in our foun-
dational project. As we shall see in the next subsection, and as is commonly acknowledged
in set theory, the concept of set is instantiated by a specific mathematical structure, the
cumulative hierarchy, but it does not automatically provide us with a fully determinate
collection of properties of sets in this structure. Now, we believe that it is possible to
derive properties of the concept of set which provide us with an indication of what further
properties the set-theoretic hierarchy should have.
There is possibly a hint of realism in this position, insofar as we view the concept of set
as being a ‘stable’ feature of our experience of sets and we subscribe to its stability in the
sense that we do not question the ZFC axioms which are true of it.
However our view follows an overall epistemological concern, that of securing the truth
of new axioms and of their first-order consequences through setting forth an alternative
evidential framework for them which does not imply a pre-formed ontological picture.
Therefore, ontology, in the most robust sense of the word, does not play a pre-eminent role
in our project.
If there is a detectable ontological framework within our account, that is the core struc-
ture we identify in §3, i.e. the tower-like multiverse of Vκ’s, where κ is a strongly inaccessible
cardinal. In turn, properties of this multiverse will motivate the adoption of one further
ontological construct, the hyperuniverse, which consists of all countable transitive models.
Neither multiverse is given a priori.
The maximality principles we will be concerned with quantify over extensions of V .
However, our language is that of first-order ZFC, therefore maximality principles do not
formally involve talk of classes. So, in the end, we have sets, and nothing else.
This ontological view might be seen as entailing a conception of truth that lacks the
requisite strength to see axioms as ‘true’. But in fact, as we will see, the concept of set
is adequate to make strong claims about set-theoretic maximality, for instance alternative
conceptions of vertical maximality are ruled out as unwarranted on the grounds of the
concept itself. It is true, however, that in order to have models where new axioms ‘live’
one has to shift to countable transitive models and, thus, to a different framework of truth.
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But this is not overall necessary. One can still appreciate the force of maximality principles
within the whole V and, thus, stick to a vision of truth and ontology entirely befitting the
concept of set. Further details on our positions will be given in the next few sections.
2.2. Two sources of evidence. Although the distinction is not entirely perspicuous,
since Go¨del (1947), it has become fairly commonplace in the literature to refer to two
main different forms of evidence for the acceptance of an axiom as ‘intrinsic’ (internal)
and ‘extrinsic’ (external) evidence. Very roughly, the distinction can be glossed as follows.
Intrinsic evidence for an axiom is that following from the concept of set, whereas extrinsic
evidence relates to the fruitfulness and success of an axiom, possibly also outside set theory.
In other terms, an axiom may be accepted either because it expresses a ‘necessary’ property
of sets or because it is corroborated by good results (and interesting practice) or for both
reasons.
The issue of whether this distinction has any plausibility is beyond the scope of this
article and, for the sake of our arguments, we will not challenge it. However, it should
be noticed that, in our opinion, in opposition to the point of view expressed by some
authors, ‘intrinsicness’ does not imply the view we have just informally rejected, that
axioms should be ‘self-evident’.3 In fact, an axiom may be true of the concept of set and
not be immediately graspable as true. This is because not all true properties of the concept
of set are immediately graspable. Therefore, arguably, it is our task to gradually uncover
such properties, by clarifying the content of our intuitions. Ideally, we should be able to
determine the properties of the concept of set, and possibly of other properties of clear
set-theoretic relevance, by following what Potter calls the ‘intuitive’ method:
The intuitive method invites us instead to clarify our understanding of the concepts
involved to such an extent as to determine (some of) the axioms they satisfy. The
aim should be to reach sufficient clarity that we become confident in the truth of
these axioms and hence, but only derivatively, in their consistency. If the intuitive
method is successful, then, it holds out the prospect of giving us greater confidence
in the truth of our theorems than the regressive method.4
But just what form of intuition does the intuitive method presuppose? Is intuition alone
sufficient to justify the adoption of set-theoretic axioms? These are no doubt vexing ques-
tions on which we cannot fully dwell in this paper. However, some considerations are in
order.
Intuition is, sometimes, construed in the Go¨delian sense, as a faculty of perception which
provides us with detailed information on mathematical objects. However, as we have seen,
3For instance, the equating of ‘intrinsicness’ with ‘self-evidence’ is clearly hinted at in the following
passage of Maddy (1988a), p. 482: ‘The suggestion is that the axioms of ZFC follow directly from the
concept of set, that they are somehow ‘intrinsic’ to it (obvious, self-evident) [...]’.
4The ‘regressive’, as opposed to ‘intuitive’, method mentioned by Potter holds that ‘...the object of a good
axiomatization is to retain as many as possible of the naive set-theoretic arguments which we remember
with nostalgia from our days in Cantor’s paradise, but to stop just short of permitting those arguments
which lead to paradox.’ (Potter (2004), p. 36)
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the programme does not commit itself to any form of object-realism. Therefore, our appeal
to intuition and the intuitive method should be construed in the following way: as hinted
at by Potter, we seem to have the ability to single out the relevant concepts and properties
that are derivable from the concept of set.
As we shall see, the cumulative hierarchy instantiates the concept of set (as described
below) and its maximality seems to follow naturally. Now, does that mean that we need to
have access to platonistic entities in order to successfully carry out this task? We do not
have a definite answer to this question, but, on the grounds of the considerations made in
the previous section, it seems natural to tentatively rule out such possibility: realism should
not extend so far as to postulate the existence of an independent, pre-formed ontology, but
rather only postulate a stable concept of set, from which further properties of sets can be
derived.
It should be noticed that we do not hold that our maximality principles, such as the IMH,
become thus straightforwardly ‘intrinsically justified’. What we believe to be intrinsically
justified by the concept of set is rather the feature of the maximality of the cumulative
hierarchy and, consequently, its maximal extendibility. Maximality principles take different
forms, so we could, at most, say that such forms are intrinsically motivated, insofar as
maximality, in general, is an intrinsically justified feature of the concept of set.
There is, of course, further work to be done to establish the stronger claim that some
of our maximality principles are intrinsically justified, and we can only hope that further
intrinsic evidence may, one day, substantially help bolster this claim.
2.3. The maximum iterative concept. Although it is not clear what Cantor took ‘sets’
to be at the beginning of his set-theoretic investigations, over the years increasingly wide
agreement has been reached that the concept implies an account of the iterative formation
of all sets along stages indexed by the ordinals. By this account, each set belongs to a stage
of what has been called the cumulative hierarchy, starting with the empty set, and then
iterating the power-set at all successor stages and the union of all sets formed in previous
stages at limit stages of the hierarchy.
In fact, the iterative conception is more correctly referred to as the ‘maximal iterative
conception’:
[MIC] 1) All sets which can be formed at each stage are actually formed. 2) The formation
of sets should continue as far as possible.
The vocabulary used in the formulation of the [MIC] has been variously interpreted as
hiding temporal, modal and, in general, metaphysical forms of mutual dependency among
sets, elements and stages, and this aspect is responsible for some sort of conceptual opacity
in the [MIC].5
However, leaving aside such troubles for the time being, it seems clear that the basic ra-
tionale underlying the [MIC] is that the procedures to form sets ought not to be constrained
5For an exhaustive overview of these issues see, again, Potter (2004), in particular, pp. 34-41, or Jane´
(2005b).
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by ‘internal’ limitations, that is, by mathematical principles hindering the maximisation
and the continuation of such formation. This line of thought has been distinctly referred
to in a fortunate article by Bernays as ‘quasi-combinatorialism’, the conceptual attitude
which would allow one to treat and manipulate all mathematical objects, both finite and
infinite, and combinations thereof, as fully determinate objects of thought.6 The maximal
character of the [MIC], therefore, can be motivated using a ‘quasi-combinatorial’ concep-
tual framework, as, by this, one does not put any constraint on the class of producible
sets.
These are well-known facts. Now, we want to take a step further. The intuitive method
invites us to focus our attention on one specific feature of the [MIC] that we are going to
use extensively in the rest of the paper. Suppose one takes the cumulative hierarchy to be
a determined object of thought, V , the universe of sets. Then the [MIC] may also imply
one further principle of ‘plenitude’, which can be formulated in the following way:
[MaxExt] Given a universe of sets, all possible extensions of it which can be formed are
actually formed.
The ‘extensions’ referred to in [MaxExt] are given by the creation of ‘new’ sets in the
only two ways we know, either adding new stages to the hierarchy or ‘producing’ new
subsets at successor stages; thus the principle seems to be perfectly justified in light of
the [MIC]. However, the principle seems to shed light on one further dimension in the
iteration, insofar as it assumes that the latter should get us beyond the universe itself.
This automatically introduces the issue of whether we have grounds to believe that the
universe is a determinate (actual) object of thought. As we shall see, there is, in fact, a
way to interpret [MaxExt] in a way which remains faithful to its nature, but does not imply
this kind of actualism.
In any case, our goal, for the time being, is to re-state the notion of ‘intrinsicness’ in
the following way: intrinsic evidence for the acceptance of an axiom is that related to the
[MIC], which, in particular, implies [MaxExt] as one of its features.
3. Conceptions of V . The ‘vertical’ multiverse
3.1. What is V ? The actualism/potentialism dichotomy. [MaxExt] seems to imply
that the universe can be ‘extended’ and that there is no limitation on how much it can
be extended. Extensions of the universe, as we said, are given by further stages in the
cumulative hierarchy or new subsets. However, as anticipated, there is a difficulty in this
point of view: the literal sense of the notion of ‘extension’, implies, at the very least, that
what is extended is an object with ‘boundaries’, that is, a ‘delimited’ object. Now, it is not
clear that the cumulative hierarchy is one such object. As a matter of fact, in the [MIC]
there is nothing which commits us to seeing V as a delimited object. On the contrary, it
would seem that V is best construed as an open-ended sequence of stages. On the other
6In Bernays’ own words, ‘quasi-combinatorialism’ ultimately refers to ‘...an analogy of the infinite with
the finite.’ See Bernays (1935), reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam (1983), p. 259.
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hand, the standard interpretation of the first-order quantifiers is that they range over the
class of all sets, as though all sets were made available to us by unbounded quantification.
So, what (if any) is the fact of the matter?
Debates over the nature of the infinite, whether it be actual or potential or both, date
already to antiquity. The two viewpoints we have summarised above extend this kind
of debate to the nature of one specific instance of the infinite, the universe of all sets.
Potentialists believe that this object is neither actual nor actualisable, whereas actualists
do.7
Now, [MaxExt] seems to fit best the potentialist viewpoint, insofar as it posits the
existence of extensions of V . For, if V is an actualised domain, how could it possibly be
extended?
Therefore, on the potentialist viewpoint as befitting [MaxExt], one cannot even speak of
V , as there is no such actualised and determinate object as V , but one should rather refer
to an endless sequence of initial segments Vα’s whose union can always be extended. This
means that [MaxExt] implies, at least, that the cumulative hierarchy is open-ended and
that new stages in the formation of sets can always be formed. However, as we have seen,
this is just one way of extending the universe. Extensions of V are not only extensions
of its height, but also of its width. The width of the universe is given by the power-set
operation and, thus, an extension of V in width means that there is also a way to expand
the range of the power-set operation.
So, now we have a more complex picture. One could be either an actualist or a poten-
tialist in either height or width, as summarised below:
Height actualism: the height of V is fixed, that is, no new ordinals can be added,
Width actualism: the width of V is fixed, that is no new subsets can be added.
Height potentialism: the height of V is not fixed, new ordinals can always be added,
Width potentialism: the width of V is not fixed, new subsets can always be added.
and combinations thereof.
As said, [MaxExt] seems to commit us to a full-blown form of potentialism, both in
height and width. This makes full sense, especially from the point of view of ‘quasi-
combinatorialism’: by this attitude, no internal limitation of the procedures to form new
sets should be applicable and this also extends to such large-scale objects as V .
However, there is one difficulty with this view. While height potentialism seems to be
robustly supported by our idea of ‘adding’ new ordinal-indexed stages to the cumulative
7An examination of the potentialist and actualist positions, with reference to the justification of reflection
principles, is carried out in Koellner (2009), which also draws upon Tait (1998a) and Tait (1998b). A
thoroughly actualist point of view on reflection is expounded in Horsten and Welch (2013). A potentialist
conception is described in Linnebo (2013), which provides a modal account of the axioms of set theory
already explored in Hellman (1989) and Parsons (1983). For the early debate on such issues as the nature
of the universe of sets, the role of the absolute infinite and proper classes, all of which are relevant to the
actualism/potentialism debate, also see the indispensable Hallett (1984), as well as Jane´ (1995), and Wang
(1996), which contains Go¨del’s late conceptions on V .
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hierarchy, so that we can always form a sequence of Vα’s increasing with α, it is far more
problematic to see how extensions of the width of the universe may come in ‘stages’. In
fact, such extensions as, for instance, the possible set-generic extensions of the universe are
not organised in stages at all.
Therefore, whereas our intuitions about the [MIC] seem to suggest that the universe is
a fully potential hierarchy of sets, in both height and width, it could be argued that it is
simply not possible to make sense of extensions of the universe in width in a way which is
in line with the iterative, stage-like character of the [MIC].
The Hyperuniverse Programme has recently fostered a conception which acknowledges
the significance of this objection,8 and that, therefore, follows a conception alternative to
full-blown potentialism which historically was first brought forward by Zermelo. We now
proceed to briefly review Zermelo’s conception.
3.2. Zermelo’s account: a ‘vertical’ multiverse. As is known, in his seminal paper
Zermelo (1930), Zermelo investigates ‘natural models’ of his axioms, that is, models indexed
by boundary numbers (fixed ordinals). Zermelo also proves that natural models form a
linear hierarchy by inclusion. An example of a natural model of ZFC is given by Vκ, where
κ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal.
Now, as said, we construe Zermelo’s position as a specific one in the actualism vs po-
tentialism debate: the Zermelian account is potentialist in height and actualist in width.
Zermelo’s actualism in width follows from the presence of second-order quantifiers in
(some of) his axioms. In fact, Zermelo’s 1930 axiomatisation is, essentially, second-order.
It is this fact that allows him to establish the quasi-categoricity of set theory or, in more
rigorous terms, that:
Theorem 1. Given any two extensional and well-founded structures M1 and M2, such
that M1 |= Z2 and M2 |= Z2 (where Z2 denotes the axioms of second-order set theory),
only three cases can occur: M1 is isomorphic to M2, M1 is isomorphic to a proper initial
segment of M2, or M2 is isomorphic to a proper initial segment of M1.
A trivial consequence of quasi-categoricity is the absoluteness of the power-set operation,
which automatically leads one to width actualism. However, our emphasis, here, is on the
‘quasi-’ bit of his result, since models may still differ in height and, thus, be extendible
in a way which clearly suggests height potentialism. In particular, Zermelo construed the
sequence of Vα’s as stopping points in an endless process of potentialisation of an only
temporarily actualised universe.
Zermelo vividly recapitulates his approach in the following manner:
To the unbounded series of Cantor’s ordinals there corresponds a similarly un-
bounded double-series of essentially different set-theoretic models, in each of which
the whole classical theory is expressed. The two polar opposite tendencies of the
thinking spirit, the idea of creative advance and that of collection and comple-
tion [Abschluss], ideas which also lie behind the Kantian ‘antinomies’, find their
8See, in particular, Antos et al. (2015) and Friedman (nd).
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symbolic representation and their symbolic reconciliation in the transfinite number
series based on the concept of well-ordering. This series reaches no true completion
in its unrestricted advance, but possesses only relative stopping-points, just those
‘boundary numbers’ [Grenzzahlen] which separate the higher model types from the
lower. Thus the set-theoretic ‘antinomies’, when correctly understood, do not lead
to a cramping and mutilation of mathematical science, but rather to an, as yet,
unsurveyable unfolding and enriching of that science. (Zermelo (1930), in Ewald
(1996), p. 1233)
Zermelo’s sequence of natural models can also be viewed as a tower-like multiverse, a
‘vertical’ multiverse, a collection of universes linearly ordered by inclusion.
Unfortunately, at the practical level, the ‘vertical’ multiverse fits only half of [MaxExt]:
extensions in height are now incorporated within this picture, whereas extensions in width
are banned. However, as we said, this seems to be more in line with some worries concerning
the impossibility, from a mathematical point of view, to account for extensions in width in
an orderly fashion.
Therefore, if we want to keep full potentialism and Zermelo’s account, we have to find
a way to address also extensions in width within this account. This task we accomplish in
the second half of the next section, by introducing V -logic.
4. The hyperuniverse (H). V -logic
In the previous sections we have established two facts: 1) intrinsic evidence relates to the
[MIC], in particular, to one of its features, that is [MaxExt]; 2) as we have seen, [MaxExt]
seems to be more in line with a full-blown potentialist picture of the universe. However,
there is no way to address extensions of the width of the universe in a way which suits the
iterative character of the [MIC], therefore we ought to settle on an account of V wherein the
width of the universe is fixed. Such an account is very fittingly provided by the Zermelian
‘vertical’ multiverse.
Before turning to the programme’s maximality principles in the next section, we first
have to carry out two tasks: we have to show that there is indeed a way to formulate
principles addressing extensions of the universe not only in height but also in width within
a Zermelian conceptual framework and, secondly, we have to identify universes where first-
order consequences of such principles hold. We start with the latter goal: the hyperuniverse
provides an ontological environment where one can investigate consequences of our maxi-
mality principles.
4.1. The hyperuniverse. Let us leave aside, for a moment, the concept of set, the [MIC]
which constitutes its full expression, the ensuing picture of the realm of sets as the cumu-
lative hierarchy and let us turn our attention to the techniques used by set-theorists to
establish results concerning set-theoretic truth.
As is known, there is only one way to establish the independence of set-theoretic state-
ments from the axioms, i.e. through finding two models wherein that statement and its
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negation are, respectively, true. If the axioms are consistent, then they cannot prove or
disprove such a statement.
There is a wide variety of models that set-theorists investigate: e.g., the constructible
universe L, core models K, HOD, M [G] (where G is a generic filter on a forcing poset
P ∈ M) and so forth. The main techniques employed consist in the construction of an
inner model and of a forcing extension of a ground model M . Almost invariably, the
ground model used is a countable transitive model.
So, the problem is the following: how do all these models relate to the concept of set,
which seemed to give rise to a unique picture of the realm of sets, that is, V ? Moreover,
does each of these models constitute a separate and, to some extent, alternative ontological
construct?
The situation we are to face up to here is direly ambivalent. On the one hand, one could
legitimately claim that all model-theoretic constructions are in V , ‘reflecting’ the universe
each in its own particular way. On the other hand, one could say that, if V is a fully
determinate construct, something which seems plausible in light of our adoption of the
[MIC] and of its associated Bernaysian ‘quasi-combinatorialism’, then all of these models
represent different and, sometimes, mutually incompatible versions of set-theoretic truth,
which cannot possibly be amalgamated into one single framework.
Now, call the view that there is a single universe of sets monism, whereas let pluralism
be the view that there are many universes, and that V has no ontological priority. Our
approach is alternative to both and may be legitimately called ‘dualistic’. Within the
programme, we are, in a sense, forced to postulate both the existence of one ‘extendible’
universe and, at the same time, that of a plural framework containing many universes,
where properties of the universe allow the detection of further set-theoretic truth. Now,
the models we want to confine our attention to are countable transitive models and our
plural framework is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Hyperuniverse). Let HZFC be the collection of all countable transitive models
of ZFC. We call HZFC the hyperuniverse.9
But just why should one confine one’s attention only to countable transitive models? Our
choice is not related to the concept of set and rather originates from concerns arising from
practice: we want to infer new truth (first-order statements) from intrinsically motivated
new axioms (maximality principles) and, in order to do this, countable transitive models are
not only suitable, but also necessary (more details on this are given below in our discussion
of V -logic). Further reasons for adopting the hyperuniverse as a multiverse construct are
more precisely substantiated in what follows:
(1) First of all, it should be noticed that H is closed under forcing and inner models,
which, as we saw, are the main techniques in the current practice. In other terms,
if we start with countable transitive models, the use of forcing and inner models
does not require more than and leave us with countable transitive models.
9Henceforth, we shall only use H to refer to it.
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(2) The satisfaction of maximality principles in countable transitive models is also
already suggested by the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem: given a statement φ, if φ
is true in V , then φ is true in some element of the hyperuniverse. However, the
notion of ‘satisfaction’, here, has to be mathematically secured more robustly (see
section §4.2 below).
(3) In H, as a consequence of its very definition, there is no ill-founded model, and
this fact is perfectly in line with our motivating evidential framework, that is, the
[MIC].
Therefore, the adoption of the hyperuniverse is entirely subservient to achieving the result
we wish to attain, that of finding new set-theoretic truth, but, as we have seen, is also well
justified in light of different concurrent considerations and, in particular, of the fact that
countable transitive models constitute the main tool used by set-theorists to investigate set-
theoretic truth, a tool whereby the iterative and well-founded character of the cumulative
hierarchy expressed by the [MIC] can be very aptly reproduced in a small-scale context.
4.2. V -logic. We now proceed to describe how one can make sense of width maximality
using V -logic. Such width maximality principles include the IMH, SIMH, IMH# and
SIMH#, all of which will be defined in the next section.
As we said, the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem allows one to argue that any first-order
property of V reflects to a countable transitive model. However, on a closer look, one
needs to deal with the problem that not all relevant properties of V are first-order over
V . In particular, the property of V ‘having an outer model (a ‘thickening’) with some
first-order property’ is a higher-order property. We show now that, with a little care, all
reasonable properties of V formulated with reference to outer models are actually first-order
over a slight extension (‘lengthening’) of V .
We first have to introduce some basic notions regarding the infinitary logic Lκ,ω, where
κ is a regular cardinal.10 For our purposes, the language is composed of κ-many variables,
up to κ-many constants, symbols {=,∈}, and auxiliary symbols. Formulas in Lκ,ω are
defined by induction: (i) All first-order formulas are in Lκ,ω; (ii) Whenever {ϕ}i<µ, µ < κ
is a system of formulas in Lκ,ω such that there are only finitely many free variables in these
formulas taken together, then the infinite conjunction
∧
i<µ ϕi and the infinite disjunction∨
i<µ ϕi are formulas in Lκ,ω; (iii) if ϕ is in Lκ,ω, then its negation and its universal closure
are in Lκ,ω. Barwise developed the notion of proof for Lκ,ω, and showed that this syntax is
complete, when κ = ω1, with respect to the semantics (see discussion below and Theorem
2).
Let us now consider a special case of Lκ,ω, the so-called V -logic. Suppose V is a transitive
set of size κ. Consider the logic Lκ+,ω, augmented by κ-many constants {a¯i}i<κ for all the
elements ai in V . In this logic, one can write a single infinitary sentence which ensures that
if M is a model of this sentence (which is set up to ensure some desirable property of M),
then M is an outer model of V (satisfying that desirable property). Now, the crucial point
10Full mathematical details are in Barwise (1975). We wish to stress that the infinitary logic discussed
in this section appears only at the level of theory as a tool for discussing outer models. The ambient axioms
of ZFC are still formulated in the usual first-order language.
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is the following: if V is countable, and this sentence is consistent in the sense of Barwise,
then such an M really exists in the ambient universe.11 However, if V is uncountable, the
model itself may not exist in the ambient universe, but, in that case, we still have the
option of staying with the syntactical notion of a consistent sentence.12
We have to introduce one further ingredient, that of an admissible set. M is an admissible
set if it models some very weak fragment of ZFC, called Kripke-Platek set theory, KP. What
is important for us here is that for any set N , there is a smallest admissible set M which
contains N as an element – M is of the form Lα(N) for the least α such that M satisfies
KP. We denote this M as Hyp(N).
And we have the following crucial result:
Theorem 2 (Barwise). Let V be a transitive set model of ZFC. Let T ∈ V be a first-
order theory extending ZFC. Then there is an infinitary sentence ϕT,V in V -logic such that
following are equivalent:
(1) ϕT,V is consistent.
(2) Hyp(V ) |= “ϕT,V is consistent.”
(3) If V is countable, then there is an outer model M of V which satisfies T .
By Theorem 2, if we wish to talk about outer models of V (‘thickenings’, that is, extensions
of the width of V ), we can do it in Hyp(V ) – a slight lengthening of V – by means of
theories, without really thickening our V , that is, without postulating that such extensions
are real. However, if we wish to have models of the resulting consistent theories, then,
using the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, we can shift to countable transitive models. And
this is precisely where the hyperuniverse comes into play.
Now, we also want to make sure that members of the hyperuniverse really witness
statements expressing the width maximality of V . One such statement is the Inner Model
Hypothesis or IMH (for whose full examination see next section).
V satisfies the IMH if for every first-order sentence ψ, if ψ is satisfied in some outer
model W of V , then there is a definable inner model V ′ ⊆ V satisfying ψ. The formulation
of IMH requires the reference to all outer models of V , but with the use of infinitary logic,
we can formulate IMH syntactically in Hyp(V ) as follows: V satisfies IMH if for every
T = ZFC + ψ, if ϕT,V from Theorem 2 above is consistent in Hyp(V ), then there is an
inner model of V which satisfies T . Finally, with an application of the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem
theorem to Hyp(V ), this becomes a statement about elements of the hyperuniverse.
5. Maximality principles for V
We have now arrived at the crux of our paper. Within the programme, we cast our
new axioms as maximality principles about V and, after having established, using the
notion of satisfaction in V -logic, that 1) these principles can be formulated in a Zermelian
11Again, for more details we refer the reader to Barwise (1975).
12This means that the hyperuniverse, although fully justifiable in view of the use of V -logic, can be
disposed of, if one only wants to keep the Zermelian multiverse (and its immediate connection with the
[MIC] and [MaxExt]).
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framework and 2) they are satisfied by members of H, we can also see what first-order
consequences they have through the study of countable transitive models, i.e. elements of
the hyperuniverse.
First, there is one point which should be emphasised again: as the reader will see in a
moment, the maximality principles that have been formulated within the programme all
address extensions of V and, therefore, in our view, they specify ways such extensions,
as postulated by [MaxExt], should be conceived of. Thus all such principles can be seen
as specifications of [MaxExt]. As our evidential framework for the search for new axioms
was given by the [MIC] and these principles follow from this evidential framework quite
naturally, we believe that we have in this way found a source for new axioms based on the
maximal interative conception.
Predictably, some principles refer to extensions in height and others to extensions in
width. Accordingly, we may say that the former address the vertical maximality and the
latter the horizontal maximality of the universe.
Vertical maximality has been recently formulated by the first author and Honzik in terms
of a strong form of reflection called #-generation. We do not discuss the details here, but
refer the reader to their paper Friedman and Honzik (nd).
Let us instead examine horizontal maximality. In the programme, this property is ex-
pressed by the IMH.
Definition 2 (IMH). If for every first-order sentence ψ, if ψ is satisfied in some outer
model W of V , then there is a definable inner model V ′ ⊆ V satisfying ψ.
Just to make things as clear as possible, ‘outer models’, in the definition above, are precisely
the formal equivalent of extensions of the universe in width. Moreover, in our view, IMH
prescribes the maximality of the universe (by using the language of ‘extensions’), insofar
as it prescribes its maximality with respect to inner models. Universes satisfying the IMH
exist in H:
Theorem 3. Assuming the consistency of large cardinals, there are members of the hype-
runiverse which satisfy the IMH.
The proof is in Friedman et al. (2008), where it is shown that the consistency of slightly
more than the existence of a Woodin cardinal is sufficient. One might question the use of
Woodin cardinals here, which may not be intrinsically justified. But note that it is not
the existence of Woodin cardinals that is needed to obtain the existence of members of H
satisfying the IMH. It is only the consistency of Woodin cardinals that is used as an auxiliary
mathematical tool in order to construct universes satisfying IMH and we believe that this
fact does not commit us to asserting the existence of such cardinals, as ‘consistency’ is far
less than ‘existence’. It should be noted, incidentally, that in all members of H satisfying
IMH there are no large cardinals at all. Therefore, if one believes that IMH is a correct
higher-order principle about V , then one obtains that there are no large cardinals in V .
But the IMH does not take vertical maximality into account. Let IMH# denote the IMH
for vertically-maximal, i.e. for #-generated, universes. In other words, M satisfies the
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IMH# if M is #-generated and whenever a first-order sentence holds in a #-generated
outer model of M , it also holds in a definable inner model of M .
Theorem 4. There are members of the hyperuniverse which satisfy IMH#.
For a proof see Friedman and Honzik (nd). The attraction of IMH# is that it captures
aspects of both vertical and horizontal maximality simultaneously.
We also mention some strengthenings of the principles given above. An absolute param-
eter is a set p which is uniformly definable over all outer models of V which ‘respect p’,
i.e. which preserve cardinals up to and including the cardinality of the transitive closure
of p. The SIMH (Strong IMH) is the IMH for sentences with absolute parameters relative
to outer models which respect them: if a sentence with absolute parameters holds in an
outer model which respects those parameters then it holds in a definable inner model.
A related principle is the CPIMH (Cardinal Preserving IMH). A cardinal-absolute pa-
rameter is a set p which is uniformly definable over all cardinal-preserving extensions of
V . Then CPIMH asserts that if a sentence with cardinal-preserving parameters holds in a
cardinal-preserving outer model of V it also holds in a definable inner model of V .
Restricting to #-generated universes yields corresponding principles SIMH# and CPIMH#.
We do not know whether there are elements of H satisfying SIMH, CPIMH or their
#-versions, but it is reasonable to conjecture that they do.13 We have:
Theorem 5. (see Friedman (2006))
(a) In all universes satisfying IMH, PD is false, and there are no large cardinals.
(b) All universes which satisfy SIMH, CPIMH or their #-versions also satisfy ¬CH.
Thus maximality principles emanating from the Hyperuniverse Programme do indeed have
striking first-order consequences.
6. New axioms as H-axioms
6.1. The nature of H-axioms. As we said at the beginning, we do not want to advocate
any specific first-order new axiom in this paper, but rather present an alternative conceptual
framework whereby higher-order statements are indeed new axioms, which also happen to
have important first-order consequences. The framework we have presented, in particular
the mathematical results detailed in the previous section, lend support to the following
conclusion: members of H satisfying maximality principles have remarkable properties,
e.g. in all countable transitive models satisfying IMH, PD is false and in all of them
satisfying CPIMH#, CH is false.
Now, let us focus our attention for a moment on ¬PD and ¬CH. These first-order set-
theoretic statements are consequences of new axioms that:
(1) hold in ‘local’ areas of H
(2) are expressed in terms of intrinisically motivated maximality principles as, respec-
tively, IMH and CPIMH#.
13In particular, there are universes which obey them restricted to the parameter ω1.
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By virtue of this, we label IMH and CPIMH# H-axioms, insofar as they hold in specific
portions of H and are intrinsically motivated on the grounds of the [MIC] and [MaxExt].
Again, it is important to emphasise on what grounds our claim can be made: using
V -logic, we can characterise the relationship between maximality principles and their con-
sequences as mirroring that between higher-order properties of V and first-order truths in
members of H. In particular, in the Hyperuniverse Programme higher-order properties of
V are, in a sense, turned into H-axioms, properties of members of H expressible through
(first-order) quantification over H.
Furthermore, we also claim that ¬PD would be, in accordance with our conceptual
presuppositions, an intrinsically motivated new set-theoretic truth insofar as IMH is an
intrinsically motivated maximality principle.
Of course there are members of H which do not satisfy the IMH. Consequently, ¬PD is
a statement holding only in a portion of H, something which accounts for our idea that
H-axioms are ‘local’ axioms. This is inevitable if one wishes to be conceptually faithful to
the multiverse phenomenon.
However, there is a global corrective to this ‘pluralistic’ view. The programme strives
for the identification of an ‘optimal’ maximality principle (H-axiom). Now, suppose that P
were such a principle; we would then exclude any member of H which would not satisfy P
and therefore P could be taken to be the ‘new’ H-axiom we are searching for, derivable from
the maximal iterative conception and with intrinsically justified first-order consequences.
It could be objected that viewing axioms as ‘consequences’ of more general principles
implies that one accepts these ‘consequences’ without understanding their ‘content’, in
particular whether they are ‘intuitively true’ and this would distance our methodology from
a genuine search for ‘meaningful’ additions to ZFC. However, the methodology envisaged
here precisely aims to provide an alternative notion of ‘intuitively true’ as based on the
acceptance of the intuitive truth of maximality principles concerning V . Therefore, in our
view, the ‘meaningfulness’ of the consequences of a maximality principle is guaranteed by
the meaningfulness of the principle itself.
6.2. Alternative approaches. Finally, we go back, again, to the issue we started with at
the beginning of this paper: what new axioms should be. First of all, we will try to dispel
one main worry about the methodology described, namely, that it could imply that all new
axiom candidates other than H-axioms should automatically fail to be viewed as plausible
new axioms and, what is worse, as lacking any evidence in favour of their acceptance.
This would be a gross misrepresentation of our perspective. In the previous subsection,
when we regarded ¬PD or ¬CH as consequences of new axioms, our aim was not to make
a general argument in favour of the rejection of PD or CH. At the same time, nowhere
in this paper have we suggested that the ‘current’ new axioms should all be rejected: the
proof of this is that, again, PD, CH or their negations have already been subjected to
extensive mathematical investigations as new axioms, and, in this respect, our programme
has nothing new to add.
What we have tried to establish here is that, if our evidential framework is preferable to
others, then there are reasons to think that PD might be rejected precisely on its grounds.
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Leaving aside our framework for a moment, it is maybe appropriate to make a brief
digression on the status of PD. Over the years, PD has been celebrated as a new axiom
for which there is a significant body of evidence.14 In particular, two aspects are almost
invariably highlighted: 1) PD is successful, because it makes the theory of sets of reals
up to and including the projective sets behave well (under PD, all projective sets of re-
als are Lebesgue measurable and every uncountable projective set of reals has a perfect
subset, which means that CH cannot be projectively refuted); 2) PD remarkably connects
two apparently distant areas of set theory, descriptive set theory and the theory of large
cardinals, as it was proved that the existence of Woodin cardinals and PD have the same
consistency strength.
However, arguments in favour of PD are mostly extrinsic and are based on the fact that
it follows from large cardinals or from set-generic absoluteness principles, but justifications
are lacking for both the existence of large cardinals and for a form of absoluteness which
imposes an artificial restriction to set-forcings.15 Also, advocates of PD often claim that
truth is taken to be based solely on current set-theoretic practice, ignoring what is relevant
for mathematics outside of set theory or for the maximal iterative conception. So arguing
that PD can be inferred from current set-theoretic practice may be insufficient for claiming
its truth.16
Now, returning to our main topic, why should all other proposed definitions of what a
‘new axiom’ should be like be replaced by ours? Because other approaches may be fraught
with insurmountable difficulties. For instance, consider the following three alternatives:
A new axiom should be a first-order statement true of the concept of set. As we have seen,
true of the concept of set means true of the [MIC], but there might be quite a few set-
theoretic statements for which such criterion cannot apply. For instance, is the Axiom of
Choice true of the [MIC]? How about the Axiom of Determinacy? Even if such criterion
is applicable, there might be cases where one intrinsically motivated first-order axiom may
contradict another enjoying the same status.
14For the full case for axioms of definable determinacy, such as PD, see, e.g., Woodin (2001), Martin
(1998), Koellner (2006).
15On this, see §8 of the present paper.
16To be fair, advocacy of PD along an alternative, intrinsic-evidence-based line of thought, has also
been made. See, for instance, Hauser (2002): ‘But aside from extrinsic evidence, there are other reasons to
regard PD as the correct axiom for the projective sets. With the progress made in the theory of canonical
models for large cardinals it has become clear that PD is implied by and is in fact equivalent to a vast
number of prima facie unrelated combinatorial principles including large-cardinal axioms. Still this may
not establish their intrinsic necessity because the relevant large-cardinal axioms at present do not enjoy the
same kind of intrinsic plausibility as for example Mahlo cardinals. However, the intrinsic necessity of an
axiom need not be immediate and could depend on the discovery of additional facts’ (p. 274). Of course,
at present it is not clear what ‘intrinsic’ facts would add to the defensibility of PD and whether they will
ultimately be discovered.
THE SEARCH FOR NEW AXIOMS IN THE HYPERUNIVERSE PROGRAMME 17
A new axiom should be a first-order statement, not intrinsically, but rather extrinsically
justified. Many new axioms such as forcing axioms or PD and, in general, definable de-
terminacy axioms, have a lot of strong extrinsic support. However, this fact may not
be sufficient and, in fact, too limited. For instance, in the Appendix (§8), we present
arguments showing that extrinsically supported absoluteness axioms may be inadequate.
A new axiom is an axiom which is ‘practically’ confirmed, that is, verified empirically in
specific areas of set theory ’. This is a refinement of the statement above. However, the
definition is still problematic, as the notion of an axiom’s being ‘practically confirmed’ is
obscure and would require clarification.17
We do not know whether the above procedure to identify and justify H-axioms and the
notion of H-axiom itself will become standard. It does seem to us that our proposal
responds better to the conceptual difficulties of the aforementioned alternative approaches.
In particular, after the substantial demise of ‘Go¨del’s programme’, the search for new
intrinsically motivated new axioms is at a loss within all other current research programmes.
The reasons have been amply considered above, especially in our introductory remarks: the
notion of set-theoretic truth falls short of a unique characterisation, if it is to reflect a unique
realm of objects, in particular as a consequence of the existence of the multiverse, and it
does not seem that this situation can be easily repaired, unless one adopts higher-order
principles motivated by the concept of set.
7. Concluding Summary
In this paper, we have shown how the search for new axioms is carried out within the
Hyperuniverse Programme. The methodology devised is motivated by the existence of three
concurrent phenomena: 1) the set-theoretic multiverse; 2) the availability of higher-order
principles describing forms of maximality of V in line with the [MIC], that is, H-axioms; 3)
a demonstrable link between such maximality principles and countable transitive models.
Maximality principles, that specify different notions of the maximality of V , also have,
through the use of V -logic, robust consequences in countable transitive models. Obviously,
different maximality principles may have different first-order consequences. So, the main
shortcoming of this conception is that it is not sufficient to fix set-theoretic indetermi-
nacy uniquely. However, we believe that the further development of the programme may
establish the existence of an ‘optimal’ maximality criterion, which, in turn, may lead to
the acceptance of one single, intrinsically justified collection of first-order statements to be
added to ZFC.
The project is open to further generalisations and developments. New maximality prin-
ciples will come out, helping us to identify further universes where certain set-theoretic
17For further details on these different approaches, see, respectively: 1) on the strength and value of
extrinsic justifications, Maddy (1996), Maddy (1997), Koellner (2006), Martin (1998); 2) on second-order
logic and set theory, Shapiro (1991), and Jane´ (2005a); 3) on the quasi-empirical view, again, Koellner
(2006), or Hauser (2002).
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statements do or do not hold. A more careful description of V , of different types of uni-
verses in H, and axioms therein, may, therefore, be on its way.
8. Appendix: Absoluteness Axioms
In recent years, considerable attention has been paid by set-theorists to what we may
call the absoluteness programme. The main goal of this programme is to foster suitable
mathematical strategies and principles (absoluteness axioms) to ‘induce’ the absoluteness
of certain set-theoretic statements across an appropriately selected collection of models (or
set-theoretic multiverse).18
Although absoluteness axioms have received a lot of extrinsic support in recent years,19
here we want to present evidence that no new first-order absoluteness axiom has good
prospects to be viewed as a plausible axiom candidate extending ZFC. As far as the ‘ex-
trinsic’ value of these axioms is concerned, the reasons for this claim are structural, that
is, refer to internal features of the absoluteness phenomenon and do not depend upon the
nature and the content of the axiom under consideration.
We now explain why this is so.
Recall the Le´vy hierarchy of logical formulas: one starts with ∆0-sentences, those with
only bounded quantifiers. Σ1- and Π1- sentences contain, respectively, one block of existen-
tial or one block of universal quantifiers followed by bounded quantifiers and, in general,
Σk+1 = ∃x1x2...xnΠk and Πk+1 = ∀x1x2...xnΣk. Also, recall that H(κ) denotes the union
of all transitive sets of size less than κ.20 The Σn-theory of H(κ) is the set of Σn-sentences
true in H(κ).
Definition 3. We say that M v N if M ⊆ N are transitive models of ZFC with the same
ordinals.
Now, there exist trivial forms of absoluteness. For instance, as is known, if M v N , where
M and N are models of ZFC, the theory of H(ω) is the same in M and N . Going one
level higher in the hierarchy of H(κ), one finds the following seminal result due to Le´vy
and Shoenfield:
Theorem 6. If M v N are models of ZFC, then the Σ1-theory of H(ω1) is the same in
M and N .
Now, what about the Σ2-theory of H(ω1)? Climbing up the scale of complexity of set-
theoretic sentences, absoluteness comes to a halt:
Theorem 7. There are models M v N of ZFC such that the Σ2-theory of H(ω1) is not
the same in M and N .
18Given a formula φ and transitive models M and N , we say that φ is absolute between M and N iff
φM (x1, x2, · · · , xn)↔ φN (x1, x2, · · · , xn).
19For an introductory overview of some of these see Bagaria (2000).
20That is, the union of all sets whose transitive closure has cardinality less then κ.
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Proof. The statement “there is a nonconstructible real” is a Σ2 property of H(ω1). Take
N to satisfy this and M to be LN . 2
This negative result may be circumvented via a two-step strategy: the first step consists
in restricting the v-relation in a suitable way. Consider the following definition:
Definition 4. M vset−generic N iff N is a set-generic extension of M .
Theorem 8 (Bukovsky21). M vset−generic N iff M v N and for some cardinal κ of M
every function in N on a set in M into M is contained in a multi-valued function in M
with fewer than κ values for each argument.
One further refinement of this definition leads to the following notion:
Definition 5. M vstationary−preserving−set−generic N iff N is a set-generic extension of M
and any subset of ωM1 which is stationary in M is also stationary in N .
In other terms, by restricting the v-relation to, respectively, vset−generic or, on the other
hand, vstationary−preserving−set−generic one only takes into account generic extensions of
models obtained through set-forcing or stationary-preserving set-forcing.
The second step in the strategy consists in considering certain extensions of ZFC, say,
ZFC + Ax., and then replacing the multiverse MZFC by the multiverse MZFC+Ax. associ-
ated to the stronger system ZFC + Ax.
Using this two-step strategy, Woodin and Viale have obtained results which are, no
doubt, of mathematical significance,22 but, with respect to our foundational project, their
results present some crucial shortcomings: 1) the axioms they consider, such as the ex-
istence of class-many Woodin cardinals, are not justified intrinsically ; 2) the restriction
of the v-relation to set-generic extensions is unwarranted in view of our definition of H.
Furthermore, even leaving these issues aside, it is not clear how far the programme they
have been carrying out can be extended, and with what results. We will come to this in a
moment.
Alternatively, one could employ only the second step of the above strategy, by supporting
the acceptance of axioms such as V = L. Go¨del’s work yields:
Theorem 11. If M v N are models of ZFC + V = L, then M = N .
However, promising though this strategy may seem, it reveals the same shortcoming as
before, insofar as it is hinged upon the acceptance of a mathematical principle, V = L,
21See Bukovsky (1973).
22See, in particular, Woodin (2001) and Viale (nd). Among other things, Woodin proved the following:
Theorem 9. If M vset−generic N are models of ZFC+ large cardinals + CH, then the Σ1-theory of H(ω2)
(with parameter ω1) is the same in M and N .
Viale has recently proved:
Theorem 10. If M vstationary−preserving−set−generic N are models of ZFC + large cardinals+MM+++,
then the theory of H(ω2) is the same in M and N .
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which does not possess a sufficient degree of intrinsic motivation in view of our notion of
‘intrinsicness’ expounded in §5.
As said, in fact, there is strong evidence that the second step in the above two-step strat-
egy, that of extending ZFC to a stronger first-order theory to obtain greater absoluteness,
is doomed to failure. Consider the following:
Theorem 12. Suppose T is a first-order theory, compatible with the following two state-
ments:
(1) the class {α : α measurable } is stationary;
(2) the class {α : Vα ≺Σω V } is unbounded.
Then, Σ2(H(ω1))-absoluteness fails for models of T : there are models M v N of T such
that the Σ2-theory of H(ω1)
M 6= Σ2-theory of H(ω1)N . If T consists of only a finite set of
axioms then (2) above is not needed.
Sketch of Proof. The hypotheses imply that there is a model V of ZFC with a largest
measurable κ such that T holds in Vκ. Now iterate the measure on κ through the ordinals,
resulting in a model N . In N , there is a model V0 like V but only satisfying KP, with
an iterable top measure. Again iterate the top measure through the ordinals to form an
inner model M . Then M v N are both models of T but by choosing V0 minimally we
can arrange that in M there is no iterable model P of KP with a top measurable κ0 such
that T holds in the Vκ0 of P . This Π2(Hω1) sentence fails in N and this gives the asserted
failure of absoluteness. 2
The theorem asserts that any first-order theory which is compatible with the existence of
measurable cardinals (in fact, a stationary class of measurable cardinals) fails to ensure
Σ2(H(ω1)) absoluteness for its models. This is very strong evidence against the use of first-
order axioms for obtaining convincing absoluteness principles for Σ2(H(ω1)) statements.
To summarise, there is a network of results which seem to show that, through the adoption
of absoluteness axioms, one can find new set-theoretic truth, by extending the absoluteness
of set-theoretic statements to levels of increasing first-order complexity. However, first
of all, none of the axioms adopted or used in the programme seems to be intrinsically
motivated. Secondly, there is also some evidence that such an extension collides with the
existence of measurable cardinals. As a consequence, one appears to be forced to artificial
restrictions of the multiverse to only certain models or of the notion of absoluteness itself.
Consequently, we come to the following conclusion: no first-order absoluteness axiom
has good prospects of being accepted as a new axiom on the grounds of both intrinsic or
extrinsic justifications.
In our opinion, if one wants to spell out a plausible conception of ‘truth in the multiverse’,
one has to proceed in the alternative way we propose, through the use of higher-order
principles.
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